What kinds of policymakers are most likely to enact legislation drafted by organized business interests? Departing from the business power scholarship that emphasizes structural, electoral, or financial mechanisms for corporate influence, I argue that lawmakers are likely to rely on businesses’ proposals when they lack the time and resources to develop legislation on their own, especially when they also hold an ideological affinity for business. Using two new datasets of “model bills” developed by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a policy group that promotes pro- business legislation across the states, I find strong support for this theory across both states and individual legislators. These results indicate that ALEC provides private policy capacity to state legislators who would otherwise lack such support, and relatedly, that low state policy capacity may asymmetrically favor certain organized interests over others – namely the business interests affiliated with ALEC. My findings have implications for the study of business influence in policymaking, as well as state politics.
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